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Introduction
Assessing the ECB’s performance is unusually difficult because both the Bank
and the context within which it operates - the integration of 12 national foreign
exchange markets - are so radically new. There is no historical precedent. Nor are
there any criteria against which to judge monetary policy designed for a group of
states, which are closely integrated but fall short of a federal structure. One does not
need to be an economic expert to appreciate that monetary policy is much more
complicated in this novel situation than it is for in a nation state or a federation which
can resort to historical precedents. There are technical difficulties – eurozone statistic
are far less reliable as a basis of policy decisions than national ones – and political
ones, in particular the preponderance of national interests. European governments
still tend to europeanise their problems and nationalise their successes. Since
European integration is still very much a work in progress, it is all too easy to
criticise the work of the ECB, not least because it is build on various, perhaps even
conflicting ulterior motives.
Any evaluation of the ECB’s first years in action has to start with the fact that the
worst fears of the single currency’s opponents have not materialised. Economic
growth has not been stifled by a soaring euro; on the contrary. And the recent
appreciation of the currency has geopolitical roots. If anything, the ECB’s policy has
stimulated economic growth as real interest rates have been much lower compared
with the low-growth period of 1991-97. Nor has the euro’s weakness generated a
significant rise in inflationary pressure. Against this background, the ECB’s
monetary policy appears more effective than the monetary policies of the EU’s
national central banks that preceded it. This positive assessment should put the more
critical comments that are to follow into context. Although the ECB has done well,
2there is room for improvement, especially since it is still a young institution that may
have a lot to learn from its own mistakes.
I will conduct this assessment in two steps. The first is a quick analysis of the
decisions by the European Central Bank, that as we shall see has gone through
different phases both regarding its activism and its efficacy. The second step is an
attempt to relate these phases to the doctrine that underlies the action of the ECB
and/or to the difficulties that arose from the fact that it is a newly established
institution.
 The European Central Bank in action
If the overall assessment is pretty positive, it is because the ECB is a young
institution that has to manage monetary policy in reference to an heterogeneous area,
and that in a few years had to go through a series of significant external shocks: The
effects of the East Asian crisis; the Oil "mini-shock"; the food prices increase due to
animal diseases and bad weather; the depreciation of the Euro; the US slowdown; the
terror attacks of September 11; and the slow agony of stock markets. All of these
shocks have had, with different delays, effects on prices, and hence had to be
addressed by the ECB in its decisions about interest rates. For these reasons the task
was not easy and the Bank dealt with it quite skilfully.
But if the ECB has done well, there is room for improvement. In effect,
looking at the same shocks chronologically, and analysing how the ECB reacted, one
is left with the impression of an insufficient degree of reactivity of the Bank, which
may have its roots in too restrictive a conception of the role of monetary policy1.
In a first phase, from the launching of the Euro to the fall of 1999, the Bank
took an expansionary  stance to face the deflationary effects of the East Asian crisis.
In April 1999 its main refinancing rate went down from 3% to 2.5%, until the
following September. Over this period it became clear to the observers that the
inflation target had a lower bound, as the ECB cared about the danger of deflation as
well.
The second phase began in the fall of 1999 in response to the second and third
shocks, namely an increase of inflation due to food and oil prices. These factors, in
addition to Euro depreciation, increased imported inflation and pushed the ECB to
change its stance to restrictive. Over the following year the refinancing rate was
progressively brought up to reach 4.75% in November 2000.
The third phase marks a change in attitude of the ECB. In spite of clear and
increasing signs of economic slowdown, the Bank kept its rate unchanged until May
2001. At that moment, it began a timid rate reduction in response to the US recession
and the continuing European slowdown, bringing the rates down of  25 basis points;
the same reduction was carried over a few months later, in August. A more serious
cut, of half a point,  occurred at mid September, but it was of course more due to the
exceptional circumstances created by the WTC attacks than to a real concern for
growth. In fact, over the following couple of months the Fed proved to be largely
                                           
1 For a more detailed account of the first four years of the Euro, see Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Jerôme Creel:
How to Reform The European Central Bank, Centre for European reform, London, October 2002.
3more aggressive in its rate cuts. At the end of 2001 the Fed funds rate was at 2%,
while the Refinancing Rate of the ECB was only cut of a further half point to 3,25%
(November 2001). It would not move from that level until the half point decrease of
December 2002, in spite of sluggish growth and decreasing inflation (especially once
the transitory effects of the introduction of the Euro are discounted). This inertia is
even more puzzling if we consider that over the year 2002 the Euro appreciated of
more than 25% with respect to the US dollar2, and that a further appreciation is
expected.
The principles guiding the ECB monetary policy
What does this rough division in phases tells us about the principles that guided
the ECB action? Mainly two things. The first is that the Bank was reactive to shocks
that directly affected inflation (oil and food prices, Euro depreciation), but much less
so to shocks that firstly had an impact on income and only through that channel on
prices (as the US slowdown). The second, and related point, is that the ECB strictly
followed its main objective (price stability), but much less so its secondary one, the
promotion of economic growth, even when it was becoming evident to most
observers that a cut in rates to sustain growth would not hamper the objective of
price stability3. To say it differently, the inertia that characterised the behaviour of
the Bank since the beginning of 2001 shows that its behaviour was in fact not
sufficiently forward-looking. The future disinflationary effects of the slowdown in
growth were not taken into consideration.
Over the past year at least, there has been a growing consensus on the fact that the
strategy of the ECB was not sufficiently balanced, and that its fear of inflation was
excessive. The criticisms were so widespread that the ECB itself is carrying on an
evaluation of its first years of activity, an initiative that has to be applauded, as it
increases the degree of responsibility and hence of credibility of the Bank.
But then we are left with the central question: Why did the ECB focus so
narrowly on inflation, both in its actions and in its communication strategy? Two
explanations, strictly related, may be highlighted.
The first is that the ECB follows what has now become the new orthodoxy in
Macroeconomics. As I argued in a previous report4, this orthodoxy amounts to
reducing as much as possible the scope for policy, by constraining monetary policy
to exclusively focus on price stability (possibly by preferring clear, intelligible rules
to discretionary decisions), and by avoiding discretionary fiscal policy through the
Stability Pact. According to this vision the task of enhancing growth and productivity
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3 The Maastricht Treaty gives the ECB the task of conducting "a single monetary policy and exchange rate
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important to recall that in the United States the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 gives growth and price
stabilisation the same weight in the Federal Reserve's statute.
4 Jean-Paul Fitoussi, "The Stability (and Growth) Pact and Monetary Policy"  European Parliament Briefing
paper n° 4-15 November 2002.
4should be exclusively left  to structural reforms aimed at eliminating distortions
particularly in the labour market. Whether this conceptual framework is coherent and
convincing is not an issue to be addressed here. It is nevertheless obvious that it is
shared by most central bankers in the industrialised countries. In spite of that, almost
invariably, this theoretical orthodoxy is coupled with a much more pragmatic attitude
in actual behaviour. The most striking case is the Federal Reserve, that continuously
manoeuvred its interest rates to influence markets with the objective of  keeping the
economy on a low inflation-high growth path. Why is it so, then that the ECB seems
to be practically the only central bank that make its acts coherent with monetary (and
fiscal) orthodoxy?
This calls into play the second explanation, that is specific to the ECB: The need
to establish a reputation. Credibility is an invaluable asset for an institution that deals
with (financial) markets in which expectations have an essential role to play. This is
a serious issue, and it would be unwise to disregard it. A young central bank has to
convince markets that it is serious about reaching its objectives, and that it has the
means and the skill to do it. Taking this into consideration, the restrictiveness of
monetary policy, and the inertia that has characterised the ECB attitude facing the
economic slowdown may be seen as signs that the Bank is focussing on its main
objective, and that it does take the time to accumulate information in order to act
efficiently.
While believing that these credibility considerations are important, I do not share
the opinion that they should be sufficient to justify the course of action the ECB
chose, particularly since early 2001. In fact, it is my opinion that the ECB has not
gained much in credibility. If a restrictive policy was the price to pay in order to
acquire credibility, then that price was largely paid in vain.
Through its actions, the ECB has acquired the reputation of being tough, but not
of being as forward looking as it pretends. Patrick Artus and Charles Wyplosz5 have
shown that if we take a standard measure of the influence of a central bank on agents
expectations, namely the responsiveness of market-determined long term rates to
changes in the Central bank rates, the ECB has been much less effective than the Fed
and the Bundesbank.
There are various reasons why the ECB did not fully convince markets:
(a) The first and more obvious is that the inflation objective the ECB has
chosen is simply too ambitious. Even in a period of low growth, inflation was above
the 2% threshold for all years except one (1999). And of course it is not beneficial to
the reputation of a central bank to miss almost systematically its target. The 2%
target reflects the particular circumstances in which it was decided (1998), a period
of atypically low inflation. Most economists believe that a target between 2% and
3% would definitively be more appropriate6.
(b) The second reason regards the rule followed by the Bank in defining its
strategy. The ECB has been following, at least in theory, the strategy called of the
"two pillars", heritage of the compromises that underlie its creation; on one side, it
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6 See Fitoussi and Creel, How to Reform ..., op.cit., p. 42.
5was supposed to target money growth ( the “reference value” is 4.5% per year7); on
the other hand, it had to take into account a composite indicator of inflationary
pressures. In practice, the money growth objective was not followed, and the ECB
simply focussed on the second pillar. But this ambiguity between the strategy the
Bank was supposed to follow and the one it actually implemented, was a nuisance for
the transparency of its acts, the effectiveness of its communication strategy, and
finally damaged the ECB in its quest for credibility.
(c) The third reason why the ECB has not yet established a good reputation
is subtler, but at the same time it may potentially be the most important. In fact, it is
impossible for a central bank to acquire credibility if, while attaining its objective, it
imposes excessive costs to the society. Most theories advocating the sole objective of
price stability rely on the hypothesis of rational expectations, that in turn implies an
absence of social costs: Private agents correctly anticipate the bank's action, and their
behaviour is modified accordingly with no effects on employment or growth. In these
conditions price stability comes for free, and a central bank that does not pursue it
acquires a negative reputation. But reality is another thing, and the low inflation
objective often comes at the cost of reduced growth, as may have been the case in
Europe in recent years. How credible can a central bank be, if in the middle of a
general slowdown on both sides of the Atlantic, with the Euro zone economy on the
brink of a recession, it refuses to lower rates because of a (largely undemonstrated)
inflationary threat? The roots of this problem are not within the ECB itself, but rather
in the Maastricht Treaty, that gives priority to inflation, and does not provide for
accountability. Political accountability means that the Central Bank has to account
for its actions in front of an institution that possessed the right – however carefully
defined – to modify the Central Bank’s statute. Although the ECB reports to the
European Parliament, the latter has only the power of persuasion to influence the
ECB. The fact that National Parliaments have hardly ever made use of this power
does not prove that it serves no purpose. Its very existence force Central Banks  to
take into account the preoccupations of a country’s elected representatives and make
better use of the information available. As a consequence, the ECB has not to take
into account the social costs of its actions, and may lack information on their
magnitude. On the other hand, the American institutional set-up makes the Fed
accountable (mainly in front of the Congress)8, and gives it the task of pursuing the
twin objectives of price stability and growth. In doing so, it forces the Central Bank
to internalise the social costs of disinflation and hence to implement a more balanced
and effective policy.
Conclusion
The analysis carried on in this short brief gives the possibility to conclude by
advancing some proposals:
1. The first is the easier to implement: The 2% objective for the inflation rate
inflation is too low, and it has to be substantially revised. This can be done either by
directly increasing it, or by allowing a larger fluctuation band around it. Regular
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6(even if infrequent) revisions of the inflation ceiling would allow to adapt the ECB
action to changing economic conditions.
2. In order to increase the accountability of the ECB, the revision of the target rate
should be carried on after consultation with politically elected organisms, like the
Council and/or (preferably) the Parliament. Being democratically responsible, these
institutions are more sensible to the social costs of monetary policy; involving them
in the process, hence, would allow to internalise these costs into the ECB action. Of
course the ECB would conserve its full independence of means.
3. Increased transparency and simplicity are important determinants of credibility.
The ECB should formally abandon the money growth objective (that is routinely
overlooked) and make explicit the exclusive focus on the second pillar that is now
hidden; by doing so, it could avoid baroque communication strategies. Furthermore,
the Bank should clarify how the different economic indicators (expected inflation,
output gap, exchange rate level, and so on) enter in its decision rule.
